Ashtyako poorkarim
The phenomenon of “state terrorism” is one of the most complex concepts in the literature of international security and comparative politics, referring to the organized use of political violence by a state or with its support against opponents, civilians, or foreign interests.
Since the first years of its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been at the center of these debates due to a series of cross-border operations and its support for non-state armed groups in the Middle East. Analyzing Iran’s behavior in this sphere requires a simultaneous look at ideological, institutional, and geopolitical variables—an approach that considers the internal structure of power, the logic of regional competition, and interaction with the international order.
A small memorial outside the former “Mykonos” restaurant in Berlin has for years preserved the names of four men: Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fattah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan, and Nouri Dehkordi.
On the evening of September 17, 1992, these four Kurdish activists were shot dead—an event later identified by the Berlin High Court as part of a policy planned by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The “Mykonos case” marked a turning point in political and legal literature, as for the first time a European court held a state responsible for organizing the assassination of dissidents on another country’s soil, and the term “state terrorism” explicitly entered legal discourse. The diplomatic consequences of that verdict pushed Iran-Europe relations to their lowest point for a decade. Although ties were gradually resumed in later years, the export of violence and the “export of crisis and terrorism” continued. Later assassinations in Denmark, the Netherlands, France, the UK, the United States, Iraq, and elsewhere showed that the absence of binding international mechanisms and economic considerations had prevented this policy from ending. Iran’s security agencies—especially the Ministry of Intelligence and the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards—have been at the center of planning and executing these acts, with ample evidence indicating that embassies and Iran-linked entities in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa provide logistical and intelligence support.
In the collective memory of non-Persian nations trapped within Iran’s artificial geography, assassination and the physical elimination of their national leaders have been a persistent instrument of state policy.
The fates of figures such as Ismail Agha Simko and Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou illustrate this pattern and raise a serious question: how, despite the persistence of organized violence, can there still be an assumption that the Kurdish question can be resolved solely within Iran’s current framework through dialogue? This question not only highlights the normative dimension but also underscores the need to rethink mechanisms of conflict resolution and security for these nations living under occupation.
In its modern sense, assassination is not confined to physical elimination; threatening activists’ families, cyberattacks, disinformation, and the creation of fear both inside and outside Iran’s political geography complement direct violence and deprive opponents of psychological and social security. Alongside these policies, Iran’s support for proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen adds an external dimension that enables regional pressure.
A review of the past four decades shows that Tehran’s foreign policy has moved along a thin line between legitimate defense and recourse to violent instruments. The 1980s began with the slogan “export of the revolution” and the formation of networks such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Operations such as the bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks and attacks on embassies in Beirut were attributed to Iran or its allies. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the pattern of “proxy operations” solidified, and Tehran, through the Quds Force, strengthened networks of militias in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and later Yemen. From 2011 onward, direct involvement in the Syrian war and support for the Houthis in Yemen expanded the same strategy. Cyber warfare and targeted killings of scientists added a new dimension to these conflicts.
From the perspective of offensive realism, Iran seeks low-cost, high-benefit tools for deterrence and regional influence in a hostile environment. Constructivism highlights the discourse of “resistance” and the legacy of the Islamic Revolution, which bolster the ideological legitimacy of these actions at home. Iran’s interaction with international institutions—from the UN Security Council to the Financial Action Task Force—shows that structural rules and pressures can either limit or amplify such policies. Legally and normatively, a state’s support for transnational violence against civilians conflicts with the prohibition on the use of force and with human-rights obligations. The lack of a binding global definition of “state terrorism” pushes assessments into the political realm, yet precedents such as the Mykonos ruling and some parliamentary inquiries in Europe show that legal accountability, though difficult, is possible. Using universal jurisdiction, targeted sanctions, and stronger protection mechanisms for political refugees can increase the cost of such behavior.
Iranian state terrorism has multilayered consequences: regionally, it has intensified sectarian rivalries and instability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen; globally, it has eroded trust between Iran and the West and prompted extensive sanctions. In response, a multidimensional approach is advised: regional security dialogues to restrain proxy actors, targeted legal pressure instead of indiscriminate measures, financial transparency and institutional reforms inside Iran, and strengthening collective memory and documentation of crimes—like the Mykonos memorial, which helps prevent the victims from being forgotten and enhances historical awareness.
State terrorism in Iran’s policy is neither purely the product of cold power calculations nor merely an outgrowth of ideology; it is the result of the interplay between identity, structure, and environmental opportunities. Studying this phenomenon—beyond political labeling—makes it possible to understand Middle Eastern security dynamics and design effective policies for regional stability and state accountability. The Mykonos experience and other historical examples show that justice and collective memory can build an effective barrier against cycles of violence and impunity, opening a path toward accountability and preventing repetition.
In conclusion, for non-Persian nations whose lands have historically been occupied by Iranian governments, the experience of negotiation has repeatedly shown that it does not bring a genuine solution. Just as the negotiation table with Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and his colleagues turned into a bloody, terror-filled scene, the behavior of Iran’s rulers has always followed this pattern and is unlikely to change. Therefore, liberation and lasting security for these nations depend on conscious efforts to establish national states and achieve the right to self-determination—not on remaining within a framework called “Iran,” which rests on the imposed borders of Sykes-Picot and disregard for the true aspirations of these peoples. The continuation of Iran’s current structure means the continuation of assassination and organized violence; and until this territory is divided into a set of independent political entities—such as Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Al-Ahwaz, South Azerbaijan, South Turkmenistan, the Caspian region, and Farsestan—and the sovereignty of these nations is guaranteed, the Middle East will not see genuine peace and stability.
