Why the United States, the West, Israel, and the world must not be deceived by the hijacking of today’s protests—and why the alternative is taking shape among the occupied nations.
The widespread protests now sweeping across the geography known as “Iran” are too often misrepresented in a significant portion of external media and analysis as a simple, linear battle: the Islamic Republic versus a “single, pro-democracy opposition”—an opposition that is frequently identified with Reza Pahlavi and monarchist networks abroad. This narrative is not only inaccurate; it is politically dangerous. It erases the voices of non-Persian nations, distorts the true nature of the protests, and lays the groundwork for reproducing the very structures of domination that are themselves the root cause of this uprising. I am writing this text not as a “theoretical discussion removed from the field,” but as a clear political warning: if the international community—especially the United States, Europe, and Israel—watches today’s protests through the glass of monarchist media, the outcome will be nothing but the repetition of historical mistakes and the reproduction of the cycle of authoritarianism.
What is unfolding today in streets, cities, and diverse regions is neither a project to restore monarchy nor a movement to “democratize Iran” within the framework of a centralized state. This uprising—particularly from the perspective of non-Persian nations—is a multinational, anti-structure revolt, and in its very essence a decolonial process: the rejection of a historical order consolidated under the name “Iran,” an order that for decades has endured through military and security mechanisms, identity engineering, and the systematic denial of the right of nations to self-determination. Therefore, my address is unambiguous: do not fall for the engineered media narratives of monarchists and networks affiliated with Reza Pahlavi. Non-Persian nations do not support the Islamic Republic, they do not support the People’s Mojahedin (MEK), and they do not support Reza Pahlavi. In their view, these three projects—despite their superficial differences—share one common core: preserving a “single Iran” and maintaining Persian-centric centralism—keeping the same cage, merely changing the guard.
Iran is not a nation-state; it is a structure of colonial domination
What the international system recognizes as “Iran” has never been, in the lived experience of non-Persian nations, a voluntary, homogeneous, historically coherent nation-state. It is a project of internal colonialism and Persian-centric state-building, formed and sustained through force: military repression, coercive homogenization, the imposition of the Persian language, the securitization of the periphery, and the systematic denial of the right to self-determination. Kurds, Baluch, Ahwazi Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, and other nations enclosed within this geography are not “ethnic minorities.” They are nations with historical territories, distinct languages, collective memory, resources, and political will—pushed to the margins under a centralist order and governed, in many cases, through a security lens. The Iranian state—whether under the Pahlavi monarchy or the Islamic Republic—has always relied on force to preserve this structure. This constant dependence on repression demonstrates that the bond between these nations and “a single Iran” is not the result of political consent, but of historical compulsion.
From this vantage point, a common misunderstanding in the West must be corrected: the central issue today is not merely “regime change.” The central issue is the transformation of the power relationship. If the Islamic Republic collapses tomorrow but the same central mechanism, the same Iran-centric ideology, and the same denial of nations remain intact, what will have happened is merely a change of flag and a change of face—not liberation.
The cycle of authoritarianism: from SAVAK to the IRGC, from crown to turban
One of the most crucial points ignored in external analyses is the historical continuity of repression in this geography. Monarchist narratives attempt to reduce the Pahlavi era to a “time of stability and progress” and portray the Islamic Republic as an “aberration.” But the nations subjected to domination have read history with their bodies and their memories—not through polished archival clips. For many people, the Pahlavi era was synonymous with absolute centralization of power, the militarization of the periphery, the suppression of tribes and local structures, the marginalization of languages, imprisonment, torture, execution and exile, and a political police apparatus (SAVAK). The Islamic Republic reproduced the same logic through a religious ideology and new instruments: the Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Intelligence in place of SAVAK, executions and prisons as tools of governance, the securitization of peripheral regions, the denial of national and cultural organization, and the continuation of structural chauvinism.
From this perspective, anything presented today as an “alternative,” if it ultimately seeks to preserve the same “single Iran” framework, does not create a fundamental difference. Non-Persian people and nations have said it again and again—and they are shouting it today in the streets—that this uprising is not about replacing the “guard of the cage.” It is about breaking the cage. The slogan is clear and cannot be hijacked:
No to the occupier, no to the corrupt,
no to the Islamic Republic,
no to the Shah and the Sheikh,
no to the Mojahedin.
This slogan is not a product of momentary emotion; it is the condensed outcome of historical experience: life within a cycle that once wore a crown, later a turban, and sometimes a tie—yet always reproduced the same logic of exclusion and humiliation.
Hijacking protests and the politics of fabrication: why the “Pahlavi sect” is a warning.
As the protests have expanded, parts of the networks affiliated with Reza Pahlavi have launched a broad effort to hijack them—an effort whose essence is the “distortion of the street.” Videos are manipulated and cut, new audio is layered over images, chants not heard on the ground are attributed to protesters, and a single narrative is manufactured claiming that “the nation” wants the return of monarchy. Yet the people of this same geography overthrew the monarchy in 1979. The notion that, after four decades, society would once again demand the return of the son of a dictator is logically and socially untenable. The issue is not merely a name; it is the logic of hereditary power: the return of politics from free popular will and a social contract back to bloodline and lineage.
Most alarming of all is how this current responds to criticism and questioning. The “Pahlavi sect,” even now—while it does not yet hold political power—seeks to steer public opinion through atmosphere-building and deception; and in many instances, when confronted with critique, it replaces transparent answers with threatening rhetoric. Reports circulating in online and media spaces have, in some cases, spoken of threats of “physical elimination” against opponents. The meaning of this behavior is clear: a current that cannot tolerate dissent while powerless will, if it approaches power, likely formalize and expand the same pattern of elimination. That is why I say the “Pahlavi sect” is not merely a political trend; it is a warning about the reproduction of authoritarianism in a modern disguise.
Alongside this, I must also point to a frequent error in Western foreign policy: the illusion of “unity of the Iranian opposition.” What is presented as the Iranian opposition is a heterogeneous set of contradictory projects. Kurds, Baluch, Ahwazi Arabs, Turkmen, Azerbaijanis, and other nations with clear national demands cannot be “resolved” within an Iran-centric unity project. A “unity” built on preserving the territorial integrity of a colonial structure is, at best, the soft administration of domination. A genuine alliance is meaningful only when nations cooperate freely on the basis of the right to self-determination—not when a pre-set ceiling called “a single Iran” is imposed over them, and then they are asked to practice “democracy” under that ceiling.
Historical memory is another point that monarchism seeks to erase. Nostalgia for authoritarianism comes alive only when collective memory is distorted or forgotten. In such a condition, slogans like “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed” reappear—slogans that, more than expressing a political position, signal a rupture from the self: cutting ties with collective memory and disregarding the blood spilled in this land in the name of “order” and “centralization of power.” How can one be Lur and at the same time invoke the name of the figure whose state-building project was intertwined with the heavy suppression of tribes and the breaking of the foundations of local and tribal life? How can one read the narratives of historical suffering and still praise a period in which many dissenting voices were silenced by bullets, the noose, and exile? Freedom is not built by glorifying a bloody past; it is built by relentless critique of power.
The real alternative is not in satellite studios, not in royal blood, and not in the externally favored oppositions. The real alternative is taking shape among the nations of the occupied lands: Kurds for Kurdistan, Arabs for Ahwaz, Baluch for بلوچستان (Baluchistan), and other nations for their own lands. These are not the margins of the protest; they are its core. The current protests were not formed to return to the past; they were formed to break out of the historical cycle of authoritarianism—religious or monarchical. If a structure called “Iran” is to remain, it will remain only through the same instruments that have kept it intact until today: repression, denial, and securitization. That means the continuation of crisis, even if names and symbols change.
In a new and free Middle East, there must be no place for reproducing a Persian-centric centralized structure that occupies the lands of non-Persian nations. A sustainable future is possible only when each nation has its own land and national state, and when regional relations are formed on the basis of equality, cooperation, and free agreements between national states—not on the paternalism of a center over a periphery.
My message to the United States, the West, Israel, and the world is clear: do not repeat the mistakes of the past. Do not confuse media visibility with legitimacy. Do not mistake Persian-language elites for “the people.” Do not impose a king, a reformist, or a manufactured opposition on nations. Supporting Reza Pahlavi—or any Iran-centric project—will not produce democracy; it will only postpone the crisis and continue the cycle of repression with a new face. The correct path is to recognize the multinational reality, engage with the genuine representatives of nations, and support the right to self-determination—rather than preserving an occupying structure.
This moment is not a choice between “Shah and Sheikh.” It is a choice between the continuation of colonial domination and the freedom of nations. And the nations, in a clear and unrepeatable voice, have said: no to the Islamic Republic, no to the Shah and Sheikh, no to the Mojahedin; no to the occupier. A free future has neither Shah nor Sheikh—and it will not allow the people’s protests to be fabricated and hijacked in the name of monarchy.
