Written by Ashtyako Pourkarim, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Independence Party
In every war, the parties involved try to present themselves as the victors, yet the reality on the ground is always more complex than propaganda and political narratives suggest. The recent war showed that none of the principal actors in this conflict—not the Islamic Republic of Iran, not Israel, not the United States, and not their regional allies—has emerged from this crisis without paying heavy political, security, military, and strategic costs. For this reason, all sides have been compelled to redefine their goals, tools, and priorities within a new framework. But this redefinition does not mean that the war has ended; rather, it shows that the conflict has entered a new and more complex phase.
Under the current circumstances, the Islamic Republic of Iran is in a position of strategic weakness, and any return to the negotiating table would come not from a position of strength, but as a result of political, economic, military, and geopolitical weakness and pressure. By contrast, the United States and Israel have managed this phase from a position of military and political superiority. From this perspective, the current negotiations, rather than bringing the war to an end, are inherently unstable, and at any moment this temporary ceasefire could collapse and disintegrate. The negotiating parties, instead of determining the end of the war, represent a kind of temporary military and political realignment—a realignment intended to create a basis for talks over the concessions Washington is demanding from Tehran. In such a situation, Iran has neither the ability to impose its demands nor a strong chance of securing American consent.
Israel’s objective is not merely to control or temporarily alter the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran; at a deeper level, it is tied to the structural weakening and even the complete collapse of Iran’s political system. From this perspective, the temporary ceasefire should not be regarded as the end of the war and hostilities; rather, it is only a temporary and tactical pause on the path toward a larger confrontation. What is taking place today is not the end of the war, but merely a short pause for preparation and reorganization on the road to a greater confrontation. Therefore, the war has been temporarily halted, but striking Iran will continue until its overthrow.
Of course, this war has not been without mistakes for Israel either. Opening a new front against Iran before neutralizing and containing Hezbollah in Lebanon and other Iranian proxy forces was a strategic mistake; a mistake that disrupted some of Israel’s own priorities in this war and left it no longer able, as in the past, to make decisions independently without turning to the United States. For example, Israel began this war from the first day with the goal of overthrowing the Iranian regime, and the opening or closing of the Strait of Hormuz was never Israel’s main concern; that was the very issue that forced Trump back to the negotiating table.
On the other hand, Iran is currently making the mistake of interpreting American restraint as a sign of weakness, whereas up to now the United States has used only the minimum level of its capabilities in confronting and fighting Iran. Even so, this limited level of intervention has still driven the regime’s political, economic, and military infrastructure into شکست and collapse.
Up to this stage, the United States and Israel can be considered the victors and winners of this war. A significant portion of Iran’s senior political and military leadership has been eliminated, the regime’s main infrastructure and key bases have suffered heavy damage, and what remains of the regime’s structure has become more worn out and ineffective than ever before. Nevertheless, the final and decisive victory of the United States and Israel will only be meaningful if it leads to the total collapse and overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Otherwise, the survival of the Iranian regime—even if it has suffered major losses—would, from a strategic perspective, amount to its victory, because the Islamic Republic would redefine that survival as a historic victory for itself and would present it domestically and even to the countries of the region as a victory against two global great powers; something that would weaken the standing of the United States and Israel as two major powers in the region.
Therefore, what is happening now looks less like a lasting peace and more like a fragile and temporary pause within a broader and deeper conflict. As long as the issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not resolved at the structural level, any ceasefire or agreement will, at best, amount only to a temporary suspension of the war, not an end to it. From the perspective of the principal actors in this war, the issue is not merely Tehran’s temporary behavior, but the structural existence of an order that is continuously producing threats, crises, and terror at both the regional and international levels.
The consequences of this situation will not remain confined to Iran’s artificial borders. If the regime survives, it may rebuild itself in the short term and move toward acquiring military nuclear capability. In such a situation, the Arab states of the region will increasingly fall under Iranian influence and greater domination by the Islamic Republic; Russia will become bolder in the war in Ukraine; American interests in the Middle East will face greater threats; and even China may begin to contemplate attack and war against Taiwan. For this reason, ending the war without overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran would not be merely a regional development, but would have direct consequences for the global balance of power, the political and military credibility of the United States, and the future of the international order.
Within this framework, it can be said that neither has the war ended nor have the balances that emerged from it been stabilized. The region has entered a new phase—a phase in which the realignment of alliances, the revision of strategies, the redefinition of geopolitical interests, and the reassessment of security policies will become more important than direct war itself. What is now taking shape is not merely the continuation of a war, but the process of redrawing and redesigning the security and political order of the Middle East.
From a geopolitical point of view, this new order will take shape without the present-day Iran. In this vision, the political structure that is today known as “Iran,” as an artificial and imposed entity, will collapse, and in its place several new political units such as Kurdistan, Balochistan, Al-Ahwaz, South Azerbaijan, South Turkmenistan, Caspian, and Farsistan will emerge. In such an order, a new Middle East will come into being—one free from domination and occupation—and stateless nations will regain their independence and political sovereignty.
In conclusion, the issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be understood merely at the level of its behavior; rather, the issue of Iran lies within its structure. From the very beginning, this regime has been built on the creation of crisis, terror, the export of its revolutionary ideology, the expansion of proxy networks, the development of missile and nuclear programs, and the continuous reproduction of tension in the region. Therefore, the central issue is not reforming the behavior of this regime, but the complete transformation of the structure that continuously produces threat, instability, and crisis. On this basis, the current conflict should not be seen merely as a war, but as a decisive turning point in the redefinition of regional and international order—a point at which the fate of the Islamic Republic, the future balance of power in the Middle East, the strategic credibility of the United States at the regional level, and even the direction of certain global crises have all become intertwined at the same time.
