Publication details:
Organized Plunder of the Heritage of East Kurdistan
Design:
KurdNation Media Center
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Prepared by:
Strategic Research Center of the Kurdistan Independence Party
✉️ kurdnational@gmail.com
Printing and publication:
KurdNation – 2026
Introduction
East Kurdistan is one of the richest and most densely concentrated historical and archaeological regions of the Zagros and the Middle East; a vast land extending from the Bakhtiari and Luristan regions to Ilam, Kermashan, Hawraman, Ardalan, Mukriyan, Neghdeh and Sindus, Oshnavieh, Urmia, Salmas, Khoy, and Maku, containing traces of several thousand years of human life.
The Paleolithic caves of the Zagros, the earliest agricultural settlements, Ganj Dareh, Ali Kosh, Chogha Sefid, Tepe Sabz, Hasanlu, Hajji Firuz, Dinkha, Dalma, Ziwiyeh, Qalaichi, Rabat, Godin Tepe, Kalmakareh, Surkh Dum, Giyan, Bisotun, Seymareh, Takht-e Soleyman, and hundreds of other mounds, caves, cemeteries, fortresses, inscriptions, sanctuaries, and historic cities are only part of an immense heritage, not all of which has even yet been identified and studied.
This heritage is not merely a collection of vessels, cups, swords, bricks, figurines, inscriptions, or architecture. Every object in archaeology is part of a body of information. The exact place of discovery, depth, soil layer, the building or grave in which the object was found, and the human and animal remains
around it, the pottery, charcoal, plant remains, and the relationship of each object to other finds are what make historical reconstruction possible. When an object
is removed from the ground without scientific documentation, the object itself may survive, but part of history is destroyed forever.
For this reason, the plunder of cultural heritage is not limited to stealing gold and silver; destroying archaeological context, transferring artifacts away from their own land, dispersing collections, removing human remains, submerging sites behind dams, destroying them through mining, and even erasing the geographical and cultural name of an artifact from museum narratives are all different dimensions of dispossessing a society of its past.
Over more than a century, the historical heritage of East Kurdistan has been separated from its original context through several routes: excavations by foreign missions authorized by the occupying Iranian state, official division of finds between the government and foreign institutions, transfer of major artifacts to Tehran, illegal excavations, sale on the antiquities market, cross-border smuggling, dam construction, mining, urban development, road construction, and military activities.
On the surface, these processes have not been identical under the laws of the government. An artifact may have been assigned to an American university under a law enacted by the Pahlavi state, while another may have been taken across the border at night by dealers. But from the standpoint of the right of the people of Kurdistan to the heritage of their own land, both cases share one fundamental issue: the people of the place of discovery did not decide the fate of the artifact.
The occupying Iranian state, both during the Pahlavi period and under the Islamic Republic, without consulting the people of Kurdistan, without the participation of an independent Kurdish institution, and without recognizing the rights of the community at the place of discovery, has decided on
the excavation, division, transfer, preservation, and display of these artifacts.
Therefore, the issue examined here is not merely “antiquities smuggling”; it is the heritage dispossession of Kurdistan.
The Occupying Iranian State and the Transformation of Kurdistan’s Heritage into State Property
From the beginning of its formation, the structure of archaeological management in the artificial political geography called Iran has been completely centralized and colonial in character.
The occupying regime in Tehran determines who may excavate; which foreign university may enter a site; how much of the finds will remain in the region; what will be transferred to Tehran; what will be given to a foreign institution; which artifact will be displayed; and what will remain in storage for decades.
In such a structure, the village beside an archaeological mound and the community that has lived in that same region for generations effectively have no right to decide.
The issue is not limited to the physical location of objects. A state that possesses the artifacts also controls their historical narrative through museums, universities, school textbooks, and cultural institutions, and distorts the history of this nation as a whole in its own interest.
Thus, control over the object is, in many cases, also control over the historical narrative attached to it.
The Pahlavi Era: When the Transfer of Heritage Abroad Acquired Legal Cover
One of the most important mechanisms for removing artifacts during the Pahlavi period was the system known as the division of finds.
After the Antiquities Law was enacted in 1930, the Iranian government created a structure under which many foreign missions could excavate in different regions and receive a share of the finds.
Encyclopaedia Iranica, in its review of the history of archaeological excavations, states that under the 1930 law, excavation finds were divided between the government and the excavating mission. (Iranica Online)
Accordingly, part of the archaeological heritage left Kurdistan not in a smuggler’s box, but with the official authorization of the Pahlavi regime.
This point highlights the distinction between “law” and “right.”
The Pahlavi government enacted the law and, under that same law, considered itself the owner of the heritage of all lands under occupation. Yet the people of Kurdistan had no role in passing that law, selecting the foreign mission, or dividing the finds.
If an artifact is found in a village in Kurdistan, the question is why the government in Tehran should have the right to decide whether it is sold or assigned to an American museum.
This is precisely the structure clearly visible in major projects such as Hasanlu.
Hasanlu: Twenty Years of Excavation in Neghdeh and Sindus
The Hasanlu Project was one of the largest and longest-running foreign archaeological projects in East Kurdistan.
The University of Pennsylvania Museum itself states that the project continued from 1956 to 1977, with a series of excavations and surveys carried out in the region between 1957 and 1977. The project director was Robert H. Dyson Jr., and its sponsors included the Penn Museum, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and the Archaeological Service of Iran. (Penn Museum)
Official Hasanlu Project file at the Penn Museum
In the project’s English-language documents, the region is described as the Ushnu-Solduz Valley. But “Solduz/Suldūz” is not the original Kurdish name of this land.
In his well-known study titled Mongol Place-Names in Mukri Kurdistan, Vladimir Minorsky states that Suldus is a Mongol name and that its Turkish form was Suldus; he also records the Kurdish form Sundus or Sindus. The title of the article itself places this geography within “Mukri Kurdistan.” (Cambridge University Press)
Minorsky’s article on Mongol place-names in Mukri Kurdistan
Accordingly, this study uses Neghdeh and Sindus, within the historical region of Mukriyan, for this geography.
The Hasanlu Project did not excavate only Hasanlu. Hajji Firuz, Dinkha, and several other sites in the region also became part of the project’s research network.
Thousands of pottery, metal, bone, tools, ornaments, architectural materials, and human remains were removed from this region.
But the fate of all these finds was not the same: some were placed in Tehran, some went to the University of Pennsylvania Museum, some became research samples, and hundreds of human remains are today held in the United States.
More Than 250 People from Hasanlu in the Stores of an American Museum
One of the most sensitive dimensions of the Hasanlu case is the fate of the human remains.
In its official description of the Biological Anthropology Section, the Penn Museum writes that two major skeletal collections from Iran—Tepe Hissar and Hasanlu—form an important core of the collection, and that each contains more than 250 relatively complete skeletons. (Penn Museum)
Penn Museum documentation on more than 250 Hasanlu skeletons
This issue goes far beyond the transfer of an object.
The remains of hundreds of people who lived in this region thousands of years ago and died at Hasanlu are now kept thousands of kilometers away in Philadelphia.
One of the best-known examples is the two skeletons known as the “Hasanlu Lovers,” discovered in 1972.
But these two represent only a very small part of the collection.
The central question is: who authorized the removal of hundreds of human remains from Kurdistan?
Was this transfer permanent?
How many of these remains have been sampled?
Is there any program for their return?
And, most importantly, why does the community at the place of discovery have no direct authority over the remains of people from its own land?
The return of human remains has today become a serious issue in museum ethics in many countries. Museums that collected human bodies and bones during colonial periods or within unequal political relationships have faced demands for their repatriation.
The Hasanlu case should likewise be reconsidered within this framework.
The Hasanlu Gold Bowl: An Artifact of Kurdistan in Tehran
The Hasanlu Gold Bowl was discovered in 1958 among the ruins of one of the burned buildings.
The Penn Museum’s report on the bowl even records details of the moment of discovery: the bowl was found near the skeleton of a person who had been carrying it when the building collapsed. After its discovery, the bowl was placed for safekeeping in the vault of a local bank and later transferred to the museum known as “Iran Bastan” in Tehran. Its registration number is also given as 15712. (Penn Museum)
Penn Museum documentation on the Hasanlu Gold Bowl
This means that one of the most important and famous objects from Hasanlu is today kept neither in Hasanlu nor in Neghdeh, but in Tehran.
This is where the concept of plunder and dispossession must be understood beyond “leaving the borders of Iran.”
If an artifact is removed from a site in Kurdistan and permanently transferred to the capital of the occupying state, the local people remain separated from their own heritage.
The fact that the transfer occurred within the artificial borders of a state does not resolve the question of cultural ownership.
Hajji Firuz: Clear Evidence of the Transfer of Artifacts to the United States
Hajji Firuz is another of the most important prehistoric sites of Neghdeh and Sindus.
The Penn Museum’s official database today holds artifacts from Hajji Firuz with specific accession numbers.
For example, an obsidian blade from Hajji Firuz with museum number 61-27-21, from the Hasanlu Project in 1961, is now displayed in the Penn Museum’s Middle East Galleries.
Another clay token, number 69-12-27, from Hajji Firuz is held in the same museum’s storage.
Example of a Hajji Firuz artifact in the Penn Museum collection
Thus, the transfer of Hajji Firuz artifacts to the United States is not a hypothesis. Specific objects with specific accession numbers are held by the Penn Museum.
Under this colonial system, the people of the region did not decide on their transfer.
The Pahlavi state, as the political ruler, placed the heritage of a several-thousand-year-old settlement in Kurdistan into a mechanism through which part of it is today located in the United States.
Dinkha Tepe: From Oshnavieh to the Penn Museum Storage
The situation of Dinkha can likewise be traced.
For example, a bronze ring with accession number 66-23-221 is registered in the Penn Museum’s official database. Its provenance is listed as “Dinkha,” and its credit line reads “The Hasanlu Project (Dinkha Tepe); Robert H. Dyson Jr., 1966.”
The object’s current location is also listed as Collections Storage—that is, the museum’s storage facility.
Registered Dinkha object in the Penn Museum
This is an important model for future research.
Rather than speaking generally about “artifacts taken out,” one can trace a single object from the site to its present-day storage location:
Dinkha → 1966 excavation → Hasanlu Project → field number → museum number → Penn Museum storage.
If this same method is applied to the thousands of finds from Hasanlu, Dinkha, Hajji Firuz, and other sites, the real scale of the transfer of heritage from East Kurdistan can be calculated.
Ziwiyeh: The Plunder of a Site and the Birth of an International Market
Ziwiyeh is one of the clearest examples of the destruction of an archaeological site by the antiquities market.
Encyclopaedia Iranica records the early history of this case in detail.
In 1948, André Godard published a group of silver objects and pottery that were said to have come from the Saqqez region. Ziwiyeh was subsequently identified as the place of discovery.
The account presented was that in 1947 villagers found a collection of gold, silver, bronze, ivory, and pottery; the regime seized these pieces for its own benefit, cut the gold pieces for division among regime leaders, and then sold them.
But the story did not end there.
Iranica states that the community of buyers—including dealers, museums, and auction houses—rushed toward the collection, and that at least one dealer family, the Rabenou family, even continued excavating the site itself. (Iranica Online)
The Ziwiyeh file in Encyclopaedia Iranica
Thus, a chain formed at Ziwiyeh:
excavation and destruction of the site; removal of artifacts without scientific documentation; local intermediary; dealer; Tehran market; foreign market; collector; and museum.
At every stage, part of the object’s information was erased.
Today, we can see the result in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York.
For a number of objects in its collection, the museum explicitly writes “said to be from Ziwiye”; in other words, “it is said to be from Ziwiyeh.” For example, an ivory piece dating to the eighth or seventh century BCE is registered with this provenance. (The Metropolitan Museum of Art)
Example of an object attributed to Ziwiyeh in the Metropolitan Museum
This seemingly simple phrase is highly significant.
One of the world’s largest museums possesses an artifact but cannot state with certainty that it actually came from Ziwiyeh.
This means the archaeological context of the object has been lost.
Senior officials of the Pahlavi regime or the royal court directly took some of the objects from Ziwiyeh for private collections and plundered them; this issue has been repeatedly cited in local and political accounts.
According to reliable sources, government trucks or vehicles transported Ziwiyeh artifacts at night.
Regardless of how much the detailed documentation of this part of the network has been opened, what is certain is that Ziwiyeh was looted before the completion of scientific study and objects attributed to it entered the global market.
Zendaya’s Earrings: Ziwiyeh Is Still on the Global Antiquities Market Eighty Years Later
In July 2026, the case of the plunder and dispersal of Ziwiyeh artifacts once again returned to the forefront of international media. Zendaya, the well-known Hollywood actress,
appeared at a London promotional event for the film The Odyssey wearing earrings made from two ancient gold plaques. The Barron London gallery attributed the plaques to the “Ziwiyeh Treasure”—the historic site near Saqqez in East Kurdistan—and stated that they were approximately three thousand years old. The pieces were later transformed into earrings with gold and diamonds by London jeweler Glenn Spiro, and the Barron gallery purchased them in 2025.
The publication of images of Zendaya wearing these objects triggered a wave of criticism among archaeologists and cultural-heritage researchers. Given Ziwiyeh’s long history of extensive looting, a number of specialists raised questions about the lawful origin of the plaques and called for full publication of their provenance, export documents, ownership history, and the manner in which they entered the London market. Euronews also reported, citing experts, that these ancient gold medallions are “probably looted.” Nearly eighty years after the beginning of the plunder of Ziwiyeh, an object attributed to that same treasure has appeared not in a museum in Saqqez and Kurdistan, but as a luxury jewel worn by a Hollywood star—a symbolic image of the path traveled by Ziwiyeh’s heritage from the soil of Kurdistan to the commercial global antiquities market.
The Luristan Bronzes: Thousands of Objects, Thousands of Lost Histories
If Ziwiyeh is one of the best-known cases of the plunder of East Kurdistan, the Luristan bronzes are among the most extensive.
Iranica states that what is today known as the “Luristan Bronzes” entered the market from the late 1920s as a result of large-scale illegal excavations. The location and cultural context of many of the objects remained unknown for a long time. (Iranica Online)
Most authentic Luristan bronzes came from graves, but only a limited number were recovered through controlled scientific excavation.
This means the widespread destruction of historic cemeteries.
A grave is not merely a place where objects are found. The position of the body, burial practice, the sex and age of the person, accompanying objects, orientation of burial, and the relationship among several graves provide very important information about an ancient society.
When a digger destroys a grave to remove a bronze sword or figurine, this information is lost forever.
The Luristan bronzes were then brought onto the global market by the mafia of the occupying Iranian regime.
Today, objects from this corpus are held in numerous museums in Europe and the United States, from Britain to America, while thousands of other pieces are dispersed among private collections.
Accounts from people of the region and Luristan state that certain khans, government officials, military personnel, and dealers with connections to Tehran organized excavations of cemeteries.
It is said that collections of Luristan bronzes remained in the homes and private vaults of families close to the Pahlavi court or were transferred abroad after the 1979 revolution.
What academic documentation clearly shows is that the market for Luristan bronzes could not have expanded to this extent without intense demand from Western collectors and museums.
The local digger was only the first link; the next was the dealer, then the Tehran or Baghdad market, then a European or American buyer, and finally a museum or private collection.
Qalaichi of Bukan: Bricks That Reached Switzerland
The Qalaichi site near Bukan is one of the most important sites associated with Mannaean culture.
The fate of the site’s glazed bricks is one of the clearest examples of the international smuggling of East Kurdistan’s heritage during the Islamic Republic.
The Art Newspaper report on the smuggled Qalaichi bricks
This case raises a fundamental question.
How were 51 large bricks taken out of Bukan?
These were not coins or small gems that could be hidden in a pocket.
To remove such a collection, there had to be excavation, packing, domestic transport, storage, intermediaries, border crossing, and a foreign network.
The excavation of Qalaichi could not have taken place without support and involvement from the Revolutionary Guards, officials, and influential individuals.
It is said that some Qalaichi bricks and objects are still kept in private collections in Europe, Israel, and the United States. The existence of dispersed pieces is plausible, but a complete list has not been published.
Another important issue is that even when the artifacts are returned, ultimate authority over them remains in the hands of institutions affiliated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Returning an artifact from Europe to Tehran is not the same as returning it to the community where it was discovered.
Rabat of Sardasht: The Shadow of the Same Network over Another Site
Rabat in Sardasht also contains important glazed bricks, architecture, and ritual remains that make it one of the most significant sites connected with Mannaean culture.
The artistic similarity of some Rabat finds to Qalaichi increases the scientific and financial value of the region’s artifacts.
Reports speak of bricks and artifacts leaving Rabat before official excavations were completed. The quantity, destination, and identities of those who removed them—who are affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards—have not been fully published, but what has been established is that some Rabat finds reached private collections belonging to officials or persons affiliated with institutions of the Iranian regime.
To clarify the scale of this case, it is essential to publish the complete find register, images from each excavation season, object numbering, and the location where the finds are held.
If even a single Rabat object is identified in an auction or foreign private collection, its route can be reconstructed by comparing photographs and material composition.
Kalmakareh: A Cave in Luristan, a Treasure Dispersed across Several Continents
The Kalmakareh Cave case presents a disturbing picture of how an archaeological collection can be dispersed.
Based on documents connected with international investigations, The Art Newspaper reported that between 1989 and 1992, before a complete inventory of the cave could be recorded, the site was looted by individuals and groups affiliated with the antiquities-smuggling mafia of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.
What happened next indicates the existence of a global network.
Objects attributed to this treasure appeared in Turkey, Japan, France, Britain, Switzerland, the United States, and other markets and private collections.
The Art Newspaper investigation into the dispersal of the Kalmakareh treasure
This case is not merely an “illegal excavation.”
We must ask:
Who bought more than 350 artifacts?
Who appraised them?
Who moved them from Luristan to major intermediaries?
How did the shipments cross the border?
Who received them in the destination countries?
According to reliable sources, after security forces and provincial officials learned of the treasure, they became involved in dividing or confiscating objects instead of providing full protection.
According to some accounts, highly important objects were removed by officials or people affiliated with the government and the Revolutionary Guards before the official team arrived; Kalmakareh objects were also taken out through diplomatic or military networks.
What is certain independently of these accounts is the extensive looting of the site and the dispersal of objects across several continents.
Godin Tepe and Seh Gabi: The Heritage of Kermashan in a Canadian Research Network
Godin Tepe in Kangavar is one of the most important multi-period sites of East Kurdistan.
Excavations at the site were linked to the Royal Ontario Museum and the University of Toronto, and the project’s materials and research archive have been used within Canada’s academic network.
The same issue also applies to Seh Gabi.
The issue is not simply the existence of a foreign project; the question is the fate of the finds.
How many objects were taken out?
Which samples are in Canada?
Which human remains were transferred?
How much remains in Tehran?
And how much is kept in Kermashan itself?
Local accounts say that important Godin finds were separated before they were entered in the official registers and were plundered by officials of the occupying Iranian regime.
Ganj Dareh: From Harsin to Foreign Laboratories
Ganj Dareh in Harsin is one of the most important Neolithic sites of the Zagros and one of the principal centers for studying the earliest stages of goat domestication and the formation of village communities.
The importance of the site today does not lie only in its artifacts.
Bone, DNA, animal remains, soil samples, maps, photographs, and excavation notebooks are also part of its scientific heritage.
Human samples from Ganj Dareh have been used in international genetic research, and different project materials have been studied at foreign university centers.
This situation illustrates a form of what may be called the scientific extraction of heritage.
Materials come from the land of Kurdistan, knowledge is produced at foreign universities, and articles and research projects are built from them, while Kurdish society has the least authority over the collection itself; most of the human remains from Ganj Dareh have been sold to foreign universities.
Regardless of the legal mechanism of transfer, the fundamental question is why human remains and scientific materials from a site in Harsin should remain separated from their own land indefinitely.
Heritage is not plundered only in the form of portable objects. Bone, DNA, soil, animal remains, plant samples, maps, notes, photographs, and archaeological data
are also part of the scientific heritage of a site. At foreign universities, these materials are transformed into articles, books, academic qualifications, research projects, and scientific prestige, while the people of the region may not even have direct access to the original collection.
Therefore, demands for the return of heritage should not be limited to gold cups or glazed bricks. Archives, images, three-dimensional models, DNA information, and other generated data should also be placed at the disposal of independent research centers in Kurdistan.
Dehloran: When a Plain Became an American Archaeological Laboratory
The Dehloran Plain was another region that attracted intense attention from foreign archaeologists during the Pahlavi period.
Ali Kosh, Buz Mordeh, Tepe Sabz, and Chogha Sefid became important in studies of the emergence of agriculture, animal husbandry, and permanent settlement.
American missions examined thousands of samples of stone tools, pottery, animal remains, plant remains, and other materials.
Some objects from the Dehloran Plain were transferred to the United States and sold under the system for dividing finds.
Metal objects and prominent artifacts were separated from the collections before complete registration and were plundered by the Iranian regime.
The region likewise requires an independent project to determine precisely which university or museum today holds each collection removed from Ali Kosh, Chogha Sefid, Tepe Sabz, and other sites.
Seymareh: The Destruction of a Historical Landscape in the Name of “Rescue”
One of the most complex forms of destruction of historical heritage occurs when the occupying Iranian state itself destroys a site for an infrastructure project.
In dam construction, the decision to build a dam is usually made first, and archaeologists are then sent into the area for “rescue excavations.”
But the term rescue must not conceal the reality.
When a valley is submerged, more than a few walls or pottery vessels are destroyed. Ancient routes; relationships between villages; agricultural lands; cemeteries; architecture; the historical landscape; the relationship between people and the river; and dozens of sites that may never have been identified are lost forever.
A small percentage of a site may be excavated, but future generations will no longer be able to return to it.
At Seymareh, this issue has particular importance.
Transferring rescue-excavation finds to state repositories while the site itself has been submerged is a two-stage process:
first, the destruction of the historical geography; then, the transfer of the rescued objects away from Kurdish society.
Many objects from dam rescue excavations disappeared before final registration; according to reports and sources, these objects were plundered by senior figures of the regime.
Mining: When History Comes Out of the Ground with the Ore
East Kurdistan is not only rich in historical sites; vast mineral resources are located in the same geography.
Takab, Qorveh, Saqqez, and numerous other regions have experienced extensive mining.
Mining machinery can destroy in a few hours a layer that remained untouched for thousands of years.
If a mine enters an unknown cemetery or an unregistered mound, no one may even learn that it existed.
In the mining areas of Takab and Qorveh, objects found during mining operations have been delivered directly to security institutions or company managers and have never been publicly registered.
The absence of transparency creates a situation in which it is impossible to know what was destroyed or removed while thousands of hectares of land were being excavated.
Transfer to Tehran and the Question of Returning Artifacts to Kurdistan
One of the most important issues in this study is the concept of “legal plunder within the borders of the occupying state.”
The removal of an artifact from Kurdistan does not necessarily mean that it leaves Iran’s political borders. As the case of the Hasanlu Gold Bowl shows, an object discovered in Neghdeh is now in Tehran. Objects from dozens of other sites are also held in museums and repositories in the occupying capital. The occupying Iranian government calls this “protection of the national heritage,” but from the perspective of a community whose artifact has been removed from its land, the question is different.
Why has a suitable museum not been built in the region itself?
Why are the finest objects separated from the cities where they were discovered?
Why does the tourism revenue they generate go to Tehran?
Why must a Kurdish researcher seek permission from a central institution to study the heritage of his or her own land?
Why is an artifact not returned to its place of discovery after suitable conservation facilities are created?
The concentration of artifacts in Tehran produces a cycle:
important artifacts are transferred to Tehran; visitors and researchers go to Tehran; funding is allocated to Tehran; the region’s museums remain weak
and then the weakness of regional museums becomes an excuse for transferring new artifacts to Tehran.
The same issue arises when artifacts are returned from abroad. If a Qalaichi brick is returned from Switzerland to Tehran, from the Iranian state’s perspective a “restitution” operation has been completed; but from the perspective of the people of Bukan, the question remains whether the object has truly returned to its own land. If Ziwiyeh artifacts are kept in repositories in the capital, do the people of Saqqez and the region where they were discovered possess real access and authority?
Real return must also include the concept of the community of origin. Otherwise, the object is merely moved from one external center to another—the occupying capital. Returning an artifact to Iran, if it does not result in its return to Kurdistan and the community where it was discovered, is not a return to its original homeland.
The Islamic Republic and a Network in Which Only the Lowest Link Is Seen
Every year, reports are published about the arrest of “illegal excavators” and the discovery of “smuggling gangs.”
Usually, those arrested are people who do not cooperate with the Revolutionary Guards’ smuggling network and are not partners of the Revolutionary Guards.
But what is not announced is usually more important than what is announced.
Who financed the excavation?
Who was the buyer?
Who determined the object’s real value?
To which country was it supposed to go?
Who was the border intermediary?
Did an official or officer cooperate?
How many shipments had the same network taken out before the arrest?
And what was the final sentence of the principal members?
The transfer of hundreds of Kalmakareh objects or dozens of large Qalaichi bricks is impossible without a multilayered network.
The local excavator is only the first link.
After him come the financier; intermediary; dealer; warehouse operator; transporter; border network; foreign buyer; and collector.
If only the excavator is identified, the real structure of smuggling remains hidden.
The Rafsanjani Family and Antiquities Smuggling
The most important published report concerns Yaser Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is described as the operator of a large antiquities network. According to sources and eyewitness evidence in Kurdistan, the Rafsanjani family took control of a large part of Kurdistan’s archaeological heritage
and sold it in markets in Europe, the United States, and the Gulf.
Eyewitnesses in Kurdistan say that Yaser Hashemi personally attended some excavations, selected the artifacts, and organized their transfer.
It has been said that the network attributed to him used aircraft, commercial companies, or family connections to remove artifacts. Government officials prepared transport, customs, exit-permit, and sales documents for them.
Rafsanjani’s children also carried out direct excavations in Kermashan, Luristan, Ilam, Mukriyan, Baneh, Bukan, Sardasht, and elsewhere.
Reports have also been published about Yaser Hashemi’s relationship with an individual who was accused in the media of antiquities smuggling.
This case is one of the most important areas requiring the opening of customs, aviation, judicial, and financial archives. If the route of a specific object from a site in Kurdistan to a foreign collection can be reconstructed, a much more precise examination of the transfer network will become possible.
The Revolutionary Guards, Security Institutions, and Military Areas
Many border archaeological sites in Kurdistan are located within military zones, close to barracks, bases, and security roads. Public and research access to these areas is restricted.
Local accounts and eyewitness testimony from Sardasht, Piranshahr, Oshnavieh, Marivan, and other border areas say that during the construction of Revolutionary Guards roads and bases, historical objects were found and removed and plundered without public registration.
Some local residents say that commanders or military contractors used information about the location of graves and mounds for excavations.
It has been said that drilling equipment and machinery from Revolutionary Guards projects have been used in many places to dig archaeological sites.
The fundamental problem in these areas is the existence of an occupying state that seeks to plunder everything in Kurdistan.
When a road or base is built in a security zone, independent archaeologists, journalists, civil organizations, and ordinary people cannot freely enter the site and examine what was found during earthworks.
For this reason, publication of reports on all civil and military projects involving extensive earthmoving is necessary to protect Kurdistan’s heritage.
Foundations, Religious Endowments, and the Private Collections of Officials
The economic structure of the Islamic Republic includes foundations, companies affiliated with military institutions, religious institutions, and private collections belonging to ruling families. Numerous accounts exist concerning private antiquities collections among officials and the children of senior figures.
Most officials of the Islamic Republic keep archaeological objects in their homes, villas, and private vaults. Even when the property of the Pahlavi family and capital owners was confiscated after the 1979 revolution, some historical objects were distributed among institutions and government figures instead of being registered in museums.
The Mostazafan Foundation, institutions under Khamenei’s supervision, or collections affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards keep historical artifacts in non-public repositories reserved for themselves.
The Global Market, Auctions, and the Fabrication of Ownership History
One of the most important drivers of the plunder of Kurdistan’s heritage has been global market demand. Without customers, commercial excavation on a large scale has no meaning. An object may initially be removed from a grave by a local individual, but its real monetary value is created when a dealer delivers it to a wealthy collector or a museum and turns plunder into an “art object” that can be bought and sold.
In this process, ownership history becomes important. A looted object needs an acceptable past in order to enter the formal market. Phrases such as “European private collection,” “acquired before 1970,” “Western Iran,” “probably Luristan,” or “said to be from Ziwiye” can conceal the decades between the looting of a site and the object’s formal sale.
Objects attributed to Ziwiyeh, Luristan, and other parts of Kurdistan have entered museums, auction houses, and private collections with exactly this kind of description. Iranian and foreign dealers have prepared old invoices, ownership letters, or fabricated acquisition dates for Kurdish artifacts. This practice is known in the global antiquities trade, but a comprehensive case file specifically addressing artifacts from East Kurdistan has not yet been published.
Some accounts speak of cooperation by diplomats, embassy staff, and transport companies with antiquities networks and the Revolutionary Guards’ mafia.
Erasing the Name of Kurdistan from the Provenance of Objects
Another issue that must be examined separately is the way artifacts are named.
In many foreign catalogues, artifacts from Kurdish regions are described under the general label “Western Iran.”
From the standpoint of the state’s political geography, this phrase may be considered correct, but its result is the removal of Kurdistan’s name from the object’s history.
If an object came from Luristan, Kermashan, Saqqez, Bukan, or Neghdeh, why should the precise name of the place not be written beside it?
Why should “Western Iran” replace the historical geographical name?
This issue becomes even more important when the object’s own place of origin is uncertain.
An object may first lose the name of its village.
Then the name of the region.
Then only “Western Iran” remains.
In this process, the object is separated not only from its soil, but also from its geographical identity.
Text of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the trafficking of cultural property
Article 11 of the UNESCO Convention and the Question of Occupation
Article 11 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention is of particular importance.
From the political perspective of Kurdish independence, this article has fundamental importance.
If the relationship between Iran and East Kurdistan is argued within a framework of territorial occupation, the issue of cultural heritage will no longer be merely a
museum dispute; rather, it becomes a question of the right of a nation under domination to the cultural resources of its own territory.
Under existing international law, formally applying the specific terminology of Article 11 to the status of East Kurdistan requires a separate legal argument; however, the existence of such a rule demonstrates that international law does, in principle, establish a relationship between cultural ownership and the condition of political power.
The Iranian Government’s Fear of Kurdistan’s Historical Heritage
This issue is not limited to the material value of artifacts.
Archaeological heritage can also challenge a state’s official narrative.
Kurdistan’s historical remains are often presented under the broad heading of “Ancient Iran.”
Mannaean, Lullubian, Luri, Kurmanji, Sorani, Hawrami, Median, Yarsani, and anything regarded as Kurdish are downplayed in the official narrative.
Important objects are transferred to Tehran.
Kurdish names of artifacts and sites are replaced in registrations by Persian or administrative names.
Museums in Kurdistan are locally named and weak in comparison with the volume of heritage.
The history of Kurdish governments receives limited presentation in official displays.
Sites connected with political resistance, such as Dimdim Castle, are presented more as architectural attractions than as places of national memory.
The heritage of Yarsan, Jewish, Christian, and other communities is at times managed without their own participation.
Control of history is one form of power.
If the state decides to which civilization an artifact is said to belong, what name it is given, and within what geographical framework it is displayed, it also affects the historical memory of society.
In this sense, the issue is not merely the theft of gold and silver objects.
The appropriation of Kurdistan’s historical narrative is also part of the same process.
Two Regimes, Two Methods, One Centralized Structure
The Pahlavi system and the Islamic Republic cannot be regarded as identical in every detail.
During the Pahlavi period, the presence of Western missions and the official system for dividing finds were prominent.
During the same period, the market for Ziwiyeh artifacts and Luristan bronzes expanded, and a vast quantity of objects entered private collections and foreign museums.
Under the Islamic Republic, the former formal system of dividing finds with foreign missions did not continue in the same form; however, illegal excavation, smuggling, dam construction, mining,
the concentration of artifacts in Tehran, and the lack of transparency concerning the Revolutionary Guards’ smuggling networks continued.
Across both structures, one principle did not change:
The people of Kurdistan have not possessed final authority over the heritage of their own land.
Tehran has made the decisions, Tehran has issued the permits, Tehran has built the museums, Tehran has held the artifacts, and in many cases—even when objects have been returned from abroad—final authority over them has remained in the hands of the central structure.
Conclusion: A Heritage That Still Must Be Reclaimed
Even if, for a moment, all accounts concerning officials, the Revolutionary Guards, the Rafsanjani family, and other government networks are set aside, the historical case is already large enough. It is documented that the Hasanlu Project operated for more than twenty years with the participation of the Penn Museum and the Metropolitan Museum, and that more than 250 Hasanlu skeletons are held at the Penn Museum. Hajji Firuz and Dinkha objects with specific accession numbers are held by the same museum, and the Hasanlu Gold Bowl was transferred to Tehran.
It is also documented that Ziwiyeh entered the market of dealers and museums before complete scientific recording; the Metropolitan Museum holds objects labeled only “said to be from Ziwiye”; 51 Qalaichi bricks were illegally transferred as far as Switzerland; more than 350 Kalmakareh objects were probably looted and objects attributed to them appeared in several countries; and from the late 1920s the Luristan bronzes entered the market as a result of extensive illegal excavations
These documents alone are sufficient to raise a very large historical question: how much of East Kurdistan’s heritage has been separated from its own land?
The history of the plunder of East Kurdistan’s heritage is not the history of a single incident, but a long process. Some artifacts reached foreign institutions during the Pahlavi period under official permits and the system of dividing finds; some entered the antiquities market; some were concentrated in Tehran; Luristan’s cemeteries were looted; Ziwiyeh entered the global market before complete scientific documentation; Qalaichi bricks were found in Switzerland; the Kalmakareh treasure was dispersed across several continents; the remains of hundreds of people from Hasanlu went to the United States; and dams and mines have destroyed or threatened other sites.
Alongside this documented history, the role of government networks, influential officials, the Rafsanjani family, the Revolutionary Guards, foundations, and security structures is also part of the broader narrative of the plunder of Kurdistan’s heritage, and opening security, judicial, customs, and financial archives could reveal its dimensions more precisely.
But the final issue is not merely who took a cup or a figurine; it is the right of a nation to its own past. The place of discovery is Kurdistan, but the decision to excavate is made in Tehran. The artifact is found in Kurdistan, but its museum destination is Tehran or Philadelphia. A person lived and died at Hasanlu, but his or her bones are kept in the United States. An object came out of the ground at Ziwiyeh, but today it may stand in New York under the vague label “said to be from Ziwiye”
while a brick made in Bukan has traveled from the soil of Kurdistan to a warehouse in Switzerland.
This is not merely the dispersal of objects; it is the dispersal of the memory of a land.
For this reason, the first demand must be complete transparency:
open the excavation archives;
publish the records of the division of finds;
publish all museum accession numbers;
identify the human remains;
register artifacts held in foreign collections;
investigate auction houses;
open smuggling case files;
investigate the role of officials and government institutions;
and prepare a comprehensive list of all East Kurdistan artifacts that are today located outside their original place.
The next stage must be the right of return of heritage: a return not merely from London to Tehran or from Switzerland to the capital of the occupying state, but a return to the land and community from which the artifact came.
Hasanlu’s heritage should be a matter for the people of Hasanlu and Neghdeh.
The heritage of Ziwiyeh should have meaning in the land of Saqqez.
The Qalaichi bricks should be part of the memory of Bukan and Mukriyan.
Kalmakareh should be reconstructed in Luristan.
Ganj Dareh should have a research center and museum worthy of it in Harsin.
And hundreds of other sites should be taken out of the position of being a “raw material source for Tehran museums and foreign universities.”
Because historical heritage belongs not only to the past.
Heritage is a means through which a nation understands itself, its land, its history, and its collective memory.
For this reason, the plunder of Kurdistan’s artifacts is not merely the theft of a few historical objects; it is the dispossession of part of the Kurdish nation’s right to narrate and own its own past.
And until the routes of the artifacts are clarified, archives are opened, removed collections are identified, human remains are addressed, and the right of the people of Kurdistan to the heritage of their land is recognized, the case of the plunder of East Kurdistan’s heritage cannot be regarded as closed.
About this publication
This book is an attempt to examine part of the hidden and plundered history of East Kurdistan: the history of the looting of archaeological remains, the transfer of historical heritage, the destruction of sites, and the plunder of Kurdistan’s cultural and natural resources by the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes of Iran. Drawing on documents, reports, and historical data, this research seeks to illuminate the dimensions of the heritage dispossession of the Kurdish nation and to present the question of Kurdistan’s heritage not merely as a cultural issue, but as part of the Kurdish nation’s right to its history, memory, and homeland.
Strategic Research Center of the Kurdistan Independence Party
Published by KurdNation Media Center — 2026
