Written by:
Ashtyako Poorkarim
Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Independence Party
What requires serious, fundamental and unequivocal criticism today is not the statement of one individual or the spokesperson of a particular party. Rather, it is the discourse, mentality and outdated, defeated political thinking of some Kurdish politicians; a mentality that calls the Kurdish national question “the Kurdish problem in Iran” and continues to see its solution within the boundaries of the same state, the same system of power and the same Iranian occupation.
The problem here is not merely one of terminology. The distinction between the “Kurdish problem” and the “Kurdish question” is not a linguistic or rhetorical distinction; it is a fundamental difference in understanding the nature of the national struggle.
The Kurds are not a “problem” for a government in Tehran to decide how to “solve” by granting a few cultural rights, a few political seats, or some form of self-administration.
What exists is a political and national question — the question of the Kurdish nation; the question of a nation that has its own land, history, language, national identity, historical memory and political will, and which has struggled for hundreds of years for independence, political sovereignty and the determination of its own destiny.
When the phrase “the Kurdish problem in Iran” is used, a fundamental assumption is accepted without discussion: that “Iran” is an eternal, legal and unchangeable framework, and that the Kurds may demand rights only within that framework. In this way of thinking, the central question is no longer what rights the Kurdish nation has over its own land and political destiny; instead, the question becomes how far the Iranian state is willing to recognise a right for the Kurds, show them favour and grant it to them.
From the perspective of modern Kurdish nationalism, this assumption must be questioned at its foundation:
Why should the destiny of Eastern Kurdistan be tied from the outset to the borders and authority of Iran?
Why should the territorial unity of an artificial and occupying Iran be treated as a sacred principle, while the Kurdish nation is regarded as an internal matter within that occupying and Kurd-killing state?
In international law, the right of nations to self-determination is one of the recognised principles of the international system, although in practice it has always existed in tension and conflict with the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of states. Yet no serious legal interpretation should turn the principle of “territorial integrity” into the final answer to a national question.
If a nation, on its own land, does not possess a genuine opportunity for free participation, social security, political sovereignty and decision-making over its own future, and if its land and geography are occupied by an occupying power, then it has a legitimate and internationally recognised right to establish a national state and assume its own political sovereignty.
With regard to Eastern Kurdistan, this question must not be reduced to the relationship between an “ethnic minority” and a “central government.” In the discourse of Kurdish nationalism, Eastern Kurdistan is part of the historical land of Kurdistan, and the central question concerns the relationship between the Iranian occupier and the right of the Kurdish nation over its own land and destiny. Therefore, the issue goes beyond cultural and administrative demands and reaches the question of political sovereignty.
Here, the boundary between two political projects becomes clear.
One project says that Iran must be democratised, Kurdistan should become federal, autonomous or confederal, and that within the framework of the brotherhood of peoples, the Kurd of an occupied land should become the brother of the Iranian occupier, while those in Tehran decide the destiny, will and aspirations of the Kurdish nation and provide, within the framework of Iranian authority, an attractive seat in the name of Kurdish rights but in reality for their own party.
The other project, however, says that the question does not end with the form of government in Tehran; rather, the relationship of sovereignty between Iran and Kurdistan itself must be questioned and reconsidered.
These two projects must not be confused.
If someone considers federalism for Iran to be the solution, that is their political right. If someone regards autonomy, confederalism or the establishment of a federal republic in Iran as their objective, they can openly defend that project. But that project must not be defined as the only legitimate form of the Kurdish national struggle.
From the perspective of independence, projects for democratising Iran, federalism, confederalism and autonomy all share one assumption:
The continuation of the authority of occupying Iran over Eastern Kurdistan.
The fundamental disagreement and difference begins here.
The political future of the Kurdish nation must not be determined within the framework of Iran’s continued existence. There is no moral or political basis that can compel the Kurdish nation forever to seek its future within the borders of Iran’s artificial political structure.
Therefore, the disagreement with those who still speak of “reconstructing Iran” or “rebuilding Iran” is not a personal or partisan disagreement; it is a disagreement over political philosophy and the ultimate objective of the struggle.
They may work to rebuild Iran; independence supporters work for national sovereignty and the independence of Kurdistan.
As long as one side regards preserving and reconstructing Iran as its ultimate objective and the other regards the establishment of an independent state and the political sovereignty of Kurdistan as its ultimate objective, these two paths are not the same at the strategic level and do not converge. In clearer language:
As long as that Iran-centred mentality remains their mentality, our water and theirs will not flow through the same channel.
This, of course, does not mean rejecting dialogue, temporary cooperation or political coexistence. In modern politics, different forces, even when their strategic objectives differ, can cooperate on specific issues. But tactical cooperation must not lead to the conflation of strategic objectives.
The objective of the independence movement is clear: the Kurdish nation must possess the right of final decision over its territory, political system, international relations and future.
From this perspective, federalism, confederalism or autonomy can become subjects of dialogue among Kurds only when they are the result of the freely expressed will of the people of Kurdistan; not a ceiling imposed from Tehran or by forces that regard Kurdistan’s continued subordination to Iran as an unchangeable principle.
That is what the right to self-determination means: no nation should be forced to choose only among options predetermined for it by an occupier or another authority.
The same principle applies to the slogan of “Kurdish-Iranian brotherhood.”
Brotherhood among peoples has meaning only when based on freedom and equality. A relationship in which one side possesses a state, army, borders, diplomatic institutions, international relations and international recognition, while the other side is forced to bargain with that same state for a portion of its own rights, is not a relationship between two equal parties.
Real brotherhood begins when no nation considers itself the owner of another nation’s land and destiny and when both parties possess their own political sovereignty.
Therefore, Kurdish independence and Kurdish nationalism must not be interpreted as hostility toward any other nation. Independence does not mean severing relations with other peoples and nations; it means changing the nature of the relationship: from subordination to neighbourly relations, from domination to equality, and from occupation to recognition of political sovereignty.
Two independent states can maintain the closest political and economic relations, keep their borders open to one another, establish a common market and even cooperate deeply within certain institutions, without either possessing political authority over the other.
Independence, therefore, does not mean opposition to regional cooperation; on the contrary, it can provide the basis for healthier cooperation among free and equal political entities.
Regarding dialogue and negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran or any other authority, it must be said that negotiation is neither inherently noble and sacred nor inherently treasonous. The political value of any negotiation depends on its subject, circumstances, balance of power and objective.
If negotiations are conducted to secure the release of political prisoners, halt executions, end military attacks, protect citizens’ lives or reduce a humanitarian crisis, they can constitute a responsible act.
But if the basis of negotiation is, from the outset, that Iranian authority over Eastern Kurdistan cannot be questioned and that the Kurdish side may only make demands concerning the extent of its rights, autonomy or participation within the Iranian structure, then such negotiations do not answer the Kurdish national question.
The central issue here must be the right to self-determination, the political map and the determination of the borders of an independent Kurdistan state.
History has given us very clear warnings regarding negotiations with occupiers.
Ismail Agha Simko was martyred during negotiations with the Iranian regime. Dr. Qasimlo was assassinated in Vienna in 1989 while sitting at the negotiating table with representatives of Iran. Several years later, Dr. Sharafkandi and his companions were assassinated in Berlin. More than a century of executions, assassinations, imprisonment, repression and military attacks has shown that the occupying Iranian state has not viewed the Kurdistan question as a relationship between two political parties possessing equal rights.
Therefore, the question is not whether Tehran is prepared to “sit down” with the Kurds.
The fundamental question is:
Negotiations for what, and sitting down to discuss what?
By what right does Iran consider itself the owner of Kurdistan and the authority entitled to determine the limits of the Kurdish nation’s rights?
A negotiation that defines “preserving Iran and its territorial integrity” as a red line from the very outset is not a negotiation about the freedom of Kurdistan; it is a negotiation about how the same authority over the Kurds is to be administered.
Historical experience has also shown that changing the form of the regime in Tehran does not mean changing the nature of the relationship between Iran and Kurdistan. Iran’s monarchy disappeared and the Islamic Republic came to power, but the Kurdish national question was not resolved. If tomorrow the Islamic Republic collapses and a secular republic, a constitutional monarchy, a federal state or any other system is established in Tehran, the question will remain:
Why should the Kurdish nation’s right to determine its own destiny be dependent upon the decision of the occupier and the form of government in Tehran?
This question cannot be answered by the slogans of democracy, federalism or the brotherhood of peoples.
If democracy prohibits a nation, from the outset, from choosing one option — namely independence — then it becomes internally contradictory in substance and in itself. People cannot be told that they are free while at the same time being told that they have no right to choose regarding one of the most important decisions concerning their destiny.
From the perspective of modern Kurdish nationalism, the principle must be clear: the Kurdish nation owns its own question, and no other state, party or ideology has the right to determine in advance the ceiling of its political demands.
From this perspective, for us the Kurdish question is not a question of administering Iran better; it is a question of political sovereignty and self-determination.
The path defended by independence supporters is the path of independence.
Not because independence is an emotional slogan, but because, within the logic of the modern state, the fullest manifestation of a nation’s political sovereignty is its ability to make independent decisions about its political system, borders and country, future and international relations.
Federalism, confederalism and autonomy may constitute legitimate political objectives for some political currents and forces, but for the independence movement they are not the ultimate objective.
The Kurdish nation has sacrificed far too much to devote yet another generation to reforming, repairing and reconstructing a structure that fundamentally defines Iranian political authority over Kurdistan as an unchangeable assumption.
Those whose project is the reconstruction and rebuilding of Iran should openly use precisely that name for their party and their project. That is their political right.
But the Kurdish national struggle must not once again become the fuel for re-establishing an occupying Iranian state; a state that throughout every historical period and every time it has collapsed, has reappeared under a new name and a new system while making the same demand of the Kurdish nation: that it retreat from its national rights and relinquish its right to political sovereignty.
Therefore, the statement must be clear and without ambiguity:
You have departed from the national current, so continue diverting the Kurdish national struggle and rebuild Iran; we, with all our strength and capacity, will work for political sovereignty and independence.
As long as this remains your mentality, our water will not flow in the same channel.
This difference and disagreement is not tactical. It is a disagreement over the very meaning of the struggle for the Kurds and Kurdistan.
If your objective is the preservation of Iran and changing its form of governance, then that is not a struggle for Kurdistan; it is a struggle for reform, restructuring and rebuilding Iran.
If your objective is to end Iranian political authority over Eastern Kurdistan and establish national sovereignty, then that is a liberation struggle for independence and is in the higher interests of the Kurds and Kurdistan.
From our perspective as independence supporters, the only path capable of bringing the political liberation of the Kurdish nation in Eastern Kurdistan to fruition is the struggle for the right to self-determination, political sovereignty and independence;
not a federalism whose limits, framework and ceiling are determined from Tehran; not a confederalism that rejects the right to separate from the occupier; not an autonomy that leaves ultimate sovereignty in the hands of the occupying Iranian central state; and not a political brotherhood that loses its meaning under an unequal relationship.
We are not a “Kurdish problem” for another state to solve.
We are a nation, the bearer of a political question, and we ourselves must determine our own destiny.
The fundamental disagreement between us, the independence supporters, and those who seek to rebuild Iran is very clear:
They see the future of the Kurds within a new Iran;
we see the future of Iran and Kurdistan as two free and equal parties, two neighbouring states sharing a border.
They tie the Kurdish question to the project of reconstructing Iran;
we tie the Kurdish question to the right of national sovereignty and independence.
They seek to determine the limits of Kurdish demands within the framework of Iran;
we say that only the people of Kurdistan have the right to determine the limits of their aspirations and their political destiny.
Kurdistan does not need to sacrifice itself once again for a new and collapsed Iran.
From the perspective of Kurdish nationalism and independence, the path to liberation does not lie in waiting for a “better Iran”; it lies in establishing an independent state and in the Kurdish nation’s ability to decide over its own land and destiny and to attain its own political sovereignty.
